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Italian regulator fined radiology centre and its IT provider a combined EUR 28,000

The Italian regulator fined a radiology centre and its IT provider a combined EUR 28,000 after patient reports were open through an editable URL without a login.

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Two identical filing drawers: the left locked with a key, the right open with a medical report bearing redacted patient data sliding out.
The Italian DPA fined a radiology centre and its IT provider a combined EUR 28,000 after patient reports were reachable through an editable URL without a login.Image: IamVera.ai — original editorial illustration

On 7 October 2026 the Italian privacy regulator fined a radiology centre and its IT provider a combined EUR 28,000 because patient reports were open through an editable URL without a login. The lesson for healthcare leaders: outsourcing a portal does not shift responsibility, and privacy measures must be tested in operation, not assumed from contract or configuration.

The Italian regulator (Garante) set out the fines in decisions nos. 764 and 754. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) reported on this case. The EDPB reported that the Italian DPA’s enforcement decisions invoked Articles 5, 25 and 32 of the GDPR across the case. The available decision materials indicate that Article 25 was relevant to the centre’s obligations, while the provider decision identified Articles 5 and 32. In practical terms, those provisions address matters including storage limitation and security of processing, while Article 25 concerns data protection by design and by default.

What did the Italian regulator decide about the radiology centre and its IT provider?

The Garante imposed a fine of EUR 16,000 on Centro Radiologico Madonna della Bruna S.r.l. and EUR 12,000 on the IT provider MedStore Saronno S.r.l. According to the Italian enforcement materials and the analysis by DPO Workspace, anyone could reach other patients' medical reports simply by changing the numeric part of the URL, without logging in. The exposed reports contained identifying and medical data. The available enforcement materials identify decisions Nos. 764 and 754 of 7 October 2026; No. 764 concerns the centre, while the related processor decision is identified in the reporting as No. 754.

This type of fault is called an insecure direct object reference: the server releases a file based on a predictable sequence number in the web address, without checking whether the visitor is entitled to it. The analysis of the decisions by DPO Workspace stresses that the regulator judged the accessibility to be serious precisely because changing a number in an ordinary browser required no technical skill whatsoever.

Why did the centre remain responsible while the provider ran the platform?

The radiology centre remained the data controller even though the platform was managed by the provider. As a processor, the provider was separately accountable for the security of the platform. Both parties therefore received their own fine. Our analysis is that the case involved more than a programming fault: the reported findings point to inadequate access control, missing security updates, reports retained longer than permitted, and the controller’s continuing responsibility for oversight of the processor.

In our assessment this is the heart of the matter: the decisions show that a predictable URL was not an isolated bug, but the visible symptom of measures that existed on paper and failed in operation. In our analysis, the decisions show why Articles 25 and 32 of the GDPR must be assessed against operational practice, rather than treated as satisfied merely by a contractual arrangement.

What does this decision mean for healthcare leaders, lawyers and CISOs outsourcing a platform?

Our analysis: because the centre remained the data controller while an external party ran the portal, outsourcing cannot simply remove a healthcare organisation's responsibility; this is why the controller must have the outsourced system's operation tested itself before it goes live and periodically thereafter. Because the exposure turned on a predictable URL without server-side authorisation checks, a processing agreement with security clauses does not suffice as the sole safeguard; this is why the lawyer must set down in that agreement the right to demonstrable testing and audit evidence, not merely a security promise. Because the reported findings included missing security updates and reports retained beyond the permitted period, the CISO must demonstrably track the provider’s patch management and deletion tasks rather than assume them; this is why it calls for periodic tests of the deletion routine and for documented exceptions to updates. Because the exposure was exploitable with an ordinary browser, our recommended incident response is to consider immediately isolating the exposed service or taking it offline, identify potentially affected patients, and assess notification obligations while remediation proceeds.

A separate healthcare enforcement development provides broader context: the EDPB reported that the French regulator CNIL fined Hôpital Privé de la Loire EUR 500,000 in a case concerning health data. That separate case illustrates why healthcare organisations should examine the operation of technical and organisational measures around special-category data; it is not the Italian incident discussed above.

Which controls should a healthcare organisation now set up on an outsourced patient portal?

The decisions translate into a concrete checklist that maps onto each element the Garante weighed. This list translates the reported shortcomings into practical controls and supplements them with related operational safeguards.

  • Require authentication and server-side authorisation for every request for a report, so that a changed URL number gives no access to someone else's data.
  • Actively test for insecure direct object references with scenarios of an ordinary logged-in user attempting to reach another's report.
  • Keep records of security updates and deliberately permitted exceptions, including who approved them and why.
  • Check the deletion and retention routine through recurring tests, so that reports are not kept longer than permitted.
  • Set down the tasks of controller and processor operationally, not only contractually, including the right to testing.
  • Retain evidence of tests, remediation and approvals, so that in an incident you can show the measures actually worked.

For healthcare organisations deploying AI applications or external processors, this touches directly on AI privacy and GDPR in practice. Anyone relying on retention periods should know which obligations still apply with pseudonymisation under the GDPR. And anyone procuring a service would do well to accept a performance or security claim only after your own test rather than on a certificate or a configuration setting.

Sources and references

  1. Italian DPA fines radiology centre and IT provider a combined EUR 28 000 for exposing patient health dataEuropean Data Protection Board · 2026-11-18
  2. Provvedimento n. 764 del 7 ottobre 2026Garante per la protezione dei dati personali · 2026-10-07
  3. Online medical reports open to anyone who changed a number in the URLDPO Workspace · 2026-11-12
  4. Health data breach: the CNIL fined Hopital Prive de la Loire EUR 500 000European Data Protection Board · 2026-09-09

Sources: The article draws on the decisions of the Italian Garante (nos. 764 and 754), the EDPB's reporting on them and an analysis by DPO Workspace, with a CNIL case as context.

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